In many respects, the image that Avicenna has in mind of the way that the Necessary Existent knows temporal and corruptible things without knowing them as such is like that of Laplace’s so-called demon. In fact, Laplace’s observation is germane here. He wrote:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom, for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes
Laplace’s sentiment echoes one that Avicenna himself made some 800 years earlier: “The Necessary Existent intellects everything only universally; nevertheless, no individual thing escapes its notice, ‘not even the weight of an atom, whether in the heavens or on Earth, escapes his notice’” (Metaphysics, VIII.8, 288.2–3). Since the Necessary Existent knows itself, it knows itself as the ultimate cause of all that exists, and thus knows the causal order of all possible things. Consequently, the Necessary Existent knows the entire order of all possible things and their relationships vis-à-vis one another, not as unfolding, as it were, but all at once
For Avicenna, strictly speaking, the Necessary Existent only knows itself. Still, inasmuch as it knows itself it knows that it is the principle of all existing things right down to the individuals. Thus, the Necessary Existent knows individuals inasmuch as it knows that to which its causal efficacy extends. In general, Avicenna argues as follows (Metaphysics, VIII.6, 288.5–13): The Necessary Existent knows itself completely and so knows itself as the principle or cause of all that exists. If, however, one completely knows a cause, one must also know all the effects of that cause. Therefore, inasmuch as the Necessary Existent is the ultimate cause of all things and completely knows itself as such, it must know all things, whether they be the causes that interact with one another or the effects that ultimately result from those interactions, which would include the individuals that come to exist actually